Watson the philosophy of watson article

Excerpt coming from Essay:

This is only making use of the mind like a metaphor intended for intelligence, yet , which would again certainly be a problem intended for James and would become a problem by an ontological perspective. In order to consider whether Watson contains a mind, and indeed whether or not any kind of computer would ever be able to have a mind, an option of Gilbert Ryle’s thoughts concerning the nature of the head is very much needed. Ryle asserts that the disbelief of the break up between the brain and the body that has been a philosophical difficulty since by least enough time of Rene Descartes arises because people misunderstand the nature of the mind by equating it with all the body. Although body is part of what Ryle calls the “deterministic system” of the world even though people have tried to explain your head using the same deterministic program, what is supposed by “mind” in this sense has nothing to do with the physical and deterministic globe an operates in a completely several manner that cannot be explained in the same terms as something deterministic. Asking how the mind functions invites a large number of problems in meaningful explanation.

Asking whether Watson includes a mind or whether or not virtually any computer could have a mind is also filled with many complications, first since the practical ddefintion of a ‘mind” and the big difference of having a mind or not having a mind would have to be described according to James, and second because the nonphysical head that is the interesting aspect of Watson (if this exists for Watson) can not be explained or understood in physical and deterministic conditions, according to Ryle. Ryle’s argument splashes on both epistemology and ontology, then, limiting what can be noted about the mind and especially the mind of one more (which is usually an epistemological problem) while also so that it is difficult to understand the nature from the mind’s presence in people and even more and so in computers and unnatural creations (which is a great ontological problem). It could be argued that Watson’s “mind” has to be purely physical, as it was created out of physical supplies and runs according to very specific physical and deterministic regulations, and this means that it is not really of the same material of the “mind” as Ryle insists “mind” is meant in discussions of mind-body mix and match. It could end up being argued, even though maybe much less strongly, which the physical regions of the brain or maybe a computer might create it feasible for thoughts to exist but that the thoughts themselves still exist in a separate and entirely several manner compared to the physical thinking apparatus, and if this had been the case it could be as not possible to know in the event Watson has a mind since it would in order to tell if perhaps another man actually had a mind of their own.

Conclusion

Technology continues to force the limitations not only of human know-how but as well of human being questions. Even though the issues of mind-body duality and of what can be considered to be true have been part of philosophical discussions for years and years, it is only in the current era of advanced computers that these questions begin to have immediate practical and ethical significance in the human being world. The fact might continue to not become entirely regarded, but in search of it is even more imrpotant than ever.